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Perspectives and Opportunities for Precompetitive
Public–Private Partnerships in the Biomedical Sector
By H. STEVENS,*,{ G. VAN OVERWALLE,{,{ B. VAN LOOY,§,{,k and I. HUYS*,{
B iopharmaceutical enterprises face majorchallenges: increased competition, falling R&D
budgets, increasing regulatory hurdles, accelerating
technological complexity, future patent cliffs, and de-
clining numbers of promising projects in their drug
pipelines.1–3 With closure of research laboratories
and redirection of R&D expenditures, pharmaceutical
firms are changing their strategic direction.4
Basic knowledge of underlying disease mecha-
nisms seems required to accelerate the development
of the next-generation’s drugs. Interdisciplinary, trans-
lational research for drug development requires col-
laboration between stakeholders from industry and
academia.5,6 A shared objective is to translate basic bi-
ological research into therapies serving patients.7
Industry realizes the potential of combining different
ideas, skills, and expertise in technologically demand-
ing areas and is increasingly tapping into early-phase
research conducted at universities and small- and
medium-sized enterprises specializing in biotechnol-
ogy (biotech SMEs).8 In addition, sharing knowledge
with competitors at the precompetitive—and even at
a competitive—stage is increasingly considered to be
both relevant and viable.9
Traditionally, the pharmaceutical businessmodel relies
heavily on intellectual property (IP) rights,10 especially
patents. Pharmaceutical companies and industry observ-
ers are questioning whether traditional business models
adequately respond to the current crisis in the drug devel-
opment sector, and whether alternative business models
are needed to revive productivity in the sector.11,12
Straightforward collaborative models, such as out-
sourcing and bilateral contracts, have a proven track
record in the pharmaceutical sector.4,7,8 Currently,
alternative and more complex collaboration models
are being explored.4,9,13 The number of multi-partner
consortia in the health sector, often based on a
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public–private partnership (PPP) model,14,15 is increas-
ing, addressing research, public education, advocacy, and
regulation, as well as quality and standardization.16–18
The first PPP in life sciences dated from the late
1980s: the Merck Mectizan Donation Program.3,19
With this initiative, a trend was initiated for PPPs at
the precompetitive stage (Table 1).7,20 Precompetitive
PPPs traditionally focus on research activities situated
before the actual drug development process. These
PPPs aim to solve basic research questions and to gen-
erate technology platforms, research tools, and predic-
tive models to advance knowledge about disease
pathways.3,15,20–23 Such activities precede the market
exploitation phase and offer opportunities to reduce
throughput time and risks associated with such prede-
velopment phases. The precompetitive R&D PPP
model is still in its infancy. Hence, there is still much
to learn about its design and implementation. Knowl-
edge development through sharing is enhanced in pre-
competitive partnerships. Taking into account the
multifaceted partnering model of (precompetitive) PPPs
and the heterogeneity of partners—including their often
conflicting missions, objectives, and cultures—it is not
surprising that IP rights play a pivotal role and that
IP and trust issues are part of the negotiation pro-
cess.6,13,22,24–27 In life sciences projects, different
types of IP protection can be sought, depending on
the intellectual creation. The most common IP protec-
tion for inventions is patents, but also other forms of IP
protection are used, such as trademark protection, in-
dustrial design, copyright, sui generis database rights,
plant variety rights, or protection of undisclosed infor-
mation (trade secrets). Patents are awarded for inven-
tions satisfying the criteria of novelty, inventiveness,
and industrial application. They award the inventor a
right to exclude others from using his invention for a
certain period of time in a certain territory.
The motives for participation in a precompetitive
PPP found in the literature differ18: whereas academia
and public sector institutions primarily perform funda-
mental research, the role of industry is focused on clin-
ical development of candidate products. Whereas
academic researchers are focused on publishing re-
sults, industry tries to generate return on investment
and increase profits.7,28 Whereas academia partici-
pates in precompetitive PPPs in return for research
funding,4 the life sciences industry participates in stra-
tegic partnerships with academia to gain additional in-
sights and knowledge in the first phases of the drug
development lifecycle: the pre-discovery and drug dis-
covery phase.7 The interest from industry in biotech-
nology SMEs’ high-quality assets has increased for
the same reasons.29,30 Image building or political rea-
sons can also provide motives for participation.
Although the literature emphasizes differences, it re-
mains relatively silent on whether these differences—
within the framework of PPPs—enable complementary
roles or might imply conflicts (of interest) as well.
The present empirical study explores the motivations
of different stakeholder groups for participation in pre-
competitive biopharmaceutical R&D PPPs. Fundamen-
tal questions arise, such as: what are the motives to
participate in a (precompetitive) R&D PPP? To what
extent are motives coinciding, conflicting or comple-
mentary? What are the challenges and barriers to
overcome? The answers provide insight into the expecta-
tions of different stakeholders and what might be needed
to improve collaboration. By interviewing different
stakeholder groups, the role of IP for the participation in
PPPs, asexperiencedby the stakeholders, canbedefined.
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collaborative models based on a contractual agreement
between (a) at least one not-for-profit organization and
(b) at least one for-profit organization.18 The former
may be public-sector institutions, such as (inter)gov-
ernmental agencies or civil society bodies (e.g., non-
governmental organizations and academia); the latter
include life science (such as pharmaceutical and bio-
technology) companies, which may be SMEs.3,32
The concept has evolved over time, and today, PPPs
can also include partners from the community sector,
voluntary sector, and other (health) groups receiving
funding from private and public sources.33,34 These
groups are often initiated by (inter)governmental
agencies to achieve a shared objective—the public in-
terest—in a cost-efficient manner24,32 by combining
multiple skills, expertise, and financial resources.34
Public–private partnerships do not equal joint ven-
tures or research investments between one public and
one private partner. The term ‘‘partnership’’ implies
joint decision-making between a number of entities,
whereby the different parties jointly address issues
with respect to resources, accountability, transparency,
and conflicts of interest.3,32
Different Types and Characteristics of PPPs
Depending on the mission and the objectives, we
classified (bio)pharmaceutical R&D PPPs into differ-
ent types (Table 1).
Precompetitive PPPs have emerged quite recently
(Table 1) and are focused on optimizing the knowledge
generation phase or the pre-discovery stage in the drug
development lifecycle (Fig. 1),3 although some have led
to the identification of potential drug compounds. Such
PPPs attempt to answer fundamental research ques-
tions. They are aimed at generating technology plat-
forms, research tools, shared databases, and predictive
models to advance knowledge of diseases, as well as
to enhance development of safer and more effective
drugs.12 The primary goal is not to discover or develop
products or therapies, so there is no use of particular
candidate products as starting materials.3 In contrast
to most product development PPPs and product access
PPPs (defined further on), which often focus on dis-
eases in commercially unattractive target populations,21
precompetitive PPPs are directed toward a broad range
of topics identified as future priorities for health.22,35
Such PPPs, having the potential to address broader pop-
ulation needs in the developed world, are therefore
more attractive for investment. Governments look fa-
vorably on competitors joining forces in a precompeti-
tive phase.2,27 Initiatives such as the Innovative
Medicines Initiative (IMI) and Critical Path Institute
(C-Path) establish PPPs between different stakeholders
in a ‘‘precompetitive’’ field (Fig. 1).
Proof-of-Concept PPPs (POC PPPs) aim to test the
proof-of-concept of promising molecules for new
medicines (Fig. 1). These partnerships start after
drug discovery and lead research projects on target
identification, target validation, and assay develop-
ment, screening hit identification, optimization of a
lead compound, preclinical (in vivo animal) studies,
and (sometimes) early clinical studies (Phase IIa) to
establish first-in-human evidence.
Product Development PPPs (PD PPPs) are based
on a ‘‘portfolio approach,’’ whereby compounds are
tested, and successful candidate products are devel-
oped in a parallel way. Spreading the investment in
drug development over several projects, whereby a
project with low expected outcome can be quickly
abandoned, which is instrumental for handling the
risk of failure effectively.15,36 In the past, small-scale
PD PPPs focusing on neglected infectious diseases
often failed because of lack of funding, expertise,
and committed involvement of companies.19 To date,
having a track record of almost 20 years, this class
of PPPs is generally recognized for its successes,
such as the Medicines for Malaria Venture (MMV),
which achieved its primary mission of bringing anti-
malaria formulations to the market.3,15,36
Product Access PPPs (PA PPPs), based on drug do-
nation, discounting, and distribution by large pharma-
ceutical companies, are the oldest PPPs in the life
sciences (Table 1).3,21 These partnerships can be estab-
lished to increase access to a variety of medicines, such
as the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization
(GAVI), which provides vaccines in the poorest coun-
tries.37 They can also be directed toward specific dis-
eases, such as Merck’s Mectizan Donation Program
for the worldwide control of onchocerciasis, also
known as river blindness, which is the world’s second
most common infectious cause of blindness.3,19
INTERVIEW RESULTS
Motives Pro Participation: Different
But Complementary
At the time of interviewing, a major theme in the es-
tablishment of—and participation in—precompetitive
32Widdus R. Public–private partnerships for health require
thoughtful evaluation. Bull World Health Org 2003;81:235.
33Yescombe ER. Public–private partnerships: principles of pol-
icy and finance. Butterworth-Heinemann (Elsevier), 2011.
34Geddes M. Making public private partnerships work: building
relationships and understanding cultures. Gower Publishing
Limited, 2005.
35Treaty on European Union (EU), 7 February 1992. O.J.
(C191) 1, 31 I.L.M. 253. 7-2-1992.
36Nwaka S. Drug discovery and beyond: the role of public–
private partnerships in improving access to new malaria medi-
cines. Trans R Soc Trop Med Hyg 2011;99S:S20–S29.
37Martin JF, Marshall J. New tendencies and strategies in inter-
national immunisation: GAVI and The Vaccine Fund. Vaccine
2003;21:587–592.
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Table 1. Categorization of PPPs
Category by Principal Aim
Name of PPP
PreC
PPP
POC
PPP
PD
PPP
PA
PPP
Start
Date
Mectizan Donation
Program
x 1987
IAVI International AIDS Vaccine Initiatives (x) x x 1996
Mectizan and
albendazole
x 1998
MMV Medicines for Malaria Venture (x) x x x 1999
GAELF Global Alliance to Eliminate
Lymphatic Filariasis
x 2000
GAVI/VF Global Alliance for Vaccines and
Immunization
x 2000
IOWH Institute for OneWorld Health x x 2000
TB Alliance/GATB Global Alliance for TB Drug
Development
(x) x x 2000
OAI Osteoarthritis Initiative x 2001
IPM International Partnership for
Microbicides
x x x 2002
Japanese Toxicogenomics
Project
x 2002
Aeras Global TB
Vaccine Foundation
(x) x x 2003
DNDi Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative (x) x x (x) 2003
GCGH Grand Challenges in Global Health x x x 2003
TRC RNAi Consortium x x 2003
ADNI Alzheimer’s Disease Neuroimaging
Initiative
x 2004
DGI Diabetes Genetics Initiative x (x) 2004
SGC Structural Genomics Consortium x 2004
TDI Tropical Diseases Initiative x 2004
C-Path Critical Path Institute x 2005
BioWin Biotechnologies Wallonie Innovation x 2006
CAVD Collaboration for AIDS Vaccine
Discovery
x x x 2006
CD3 Centre for Drug Design and Discovery x 2006
CDRD Centre for Drugs Research and
Development
x 2006
FDA Public-Private
Partnership Program
x 2006
GAIN Genetic Association Identification
Network
x 2006
TI Pharma Top Institute Pharma x x x 2006
BMM BioMedical Materials Program x 2007
CTMM (Diagnostics) Center for Translational Molecular
Medicine
x x x 2007
Project PPPs Under FP-Health European Framework Programmes x 2007
ITC International Transporter Consortium x 2007
OMOP Observational Medical Outcomes
Partnership
x 2007
SysDiag x 2007
IMI Innovative Medicines Initiative x (x) 2008
OSDD Open Source Drug Discovery x x x 2008
Eurobiomed x x x 2009
LDC Lead Discovery Center x 2009
Sage Bionetworks Sage Bionetworks Commons x 2009
Non-exhaustive list to illustrate the emergence of precompetitive PPPs in the life science R&D sector. Examples are filtered through literature
review (Sources: Pubmed, ScienceDirect, Google, and cited references). Based on a review of the websites, categorization was done.
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PPPs concerned the motivations of public and private
actors. Common motives for the biomedical industry,
SMEs, TTOs, and academia to participate in precom-
petitive PPPs were ‘‘innovation’’ and ‘‘enhancement of
expertise in a specific field.’’ Pharmaceutical company
experts highlighted ‘‘creativity,’’ ‘‘risk sharing,’’ ‘‘cost
reduction,’’ and ‘‘avoiding duplication’’ as important
drivers to participate. A major factor for academia
and TTOs was research funding: all seven academic
and all five TTO interviewees indicated that ‘‘money’’
was one of the main motives for participation, as
well as ‘‘project scope’’ and ‘‘publication possibili-
ties.’’ SMEs hoped to see their participation in PPPs
converted into ‘‘money’’ and ‘‘knowledge transfer.’’
An intriguing result was the interest of SMEs in ‘‘IP
opportunities.’’
It is important to note that both industry and acade-
mia added ‘‘complementarity of knowledge and disci-
plines’’ and ‘‘generating information on (possible)
future partners’’ to the list of motives for participation
in a PPP. All the interviewees stated that ‘‘networking
possibilities’’ and ‘‘top scientists participating in the
project’’ were important considerations for participa-
tion. Some interviewees highlighted the ‘‘fear of miss-
ing out.’’ Participation in a PPP was seen to be good
for an institution’s or company’s image and for the re-
searchers’ status, according to academic interviewees.
SMEs and TTOs stressed the importance of ‘‘the pos-
sibility to partner with a well-established company.’’
Most interviewees highly welcomed the participation
of a European agency, such as the European Medicines
Agency (EMA), in PPPs for guidance and early involve-
ment in regulatory approaches for innovative ideas.
Motives Contra Participation: Handling IP
During the interviews, ‘‘lack of trust’’ was indicated
as a common reason impeding interviewees’ participa-
tion in a PPP. While ‘‘IP opportunities’’ were not rated
high as a driver for participation, ‘‘IP hurdles,’’ ‘‘se-
crecy issues,’’ and ‘‘fear of giving away know-how’’
were major concerns of all stakeholders. Interviewees
with experience in participating in PPPs also added
‘‘the administrative burden’’ and ‘‘PPPs’ organiza-
tional structure’’ as jeopardizing future participation.
Pharmaceutical companies and TTOs further stated
that ‘‘high cost’’ and ‘‘lack of innovation’’ could also
explain non-participation. Academic, TTO, and indus-
try interviewees acknowledged the difficult position
for SMEs, and the limited return on investment they
might expect.
Intellectual Property Issues in PPPs
Remarkably, SMEs listed ‘‘IP opportunities’’ as a
motive for participation. At the same time, SMEs as
well as TTOs considered IP a hurdle for participation
in a PPP. All five TTO interviewees stated that a PPP’s
IP framework could hinder participation. ‘‘Lack of
trust’’ was highly ranked by all interviewees and was
related to IP hurdles. Some academic interviewees
were convinced that industry tries to protect its
FIG. 1. On the discovery–development–delivery continuum in the biopharmaceutical sector, precompetitive PPPs are sit-
uated before and at the early discovery of promising drug compounds. Proof-of-concept PPPs (POC PPPs) aim at target
identification and validation. Product development PPPs (PD PPPs) focus on drug development. Product access PPPs
(PA PPPs) target drug donation, discounting, and distribution. (M.A. =market authorization)
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intellectual assets with IP, but expects academia to
share all its IP, considering it to be ‘‘common,’’ ‘‘pre-
competitive’’ knowledge.
Academia/TTO and SMEs highlighted their con-
cerns with regard to ‘‘publication versus patent filing’’
and ‘‘loss of exclusivity.’’ The lack of ‘‘access to back-
ground’’ (background IP means pre-existing IP made
available to the partners of the consortium prior to
the commencement of the project) or, conversely,
‘‘access to background’’ that reaches too far, were
both connected to a lack of trust among partners. By
granting broad—sometimes unlimited—access rights
to background IP, academia/TTO and SMEs feared
losing exclusivity and thus their position to negotiate
deals with future interested actors. This was also
seen as causing them to run a risk of potential conflicts
of interest with existing contracts. In the framework of
PPPs, academia/TTO and SMEs suggested that indus-
trial parties wanted them to offer technology at bargain
prices. At the same time, academia/TTO and SMEs
feared that not participating in a project would result
in loss of visibility. Even worse, it was feared that if
they did not participate, their core technology would
be surpassed by alternative solutions, and interesting
IP opportunities might be missed.
Academia and SME representatives are thus left with
three options: (1) not to participate in PPPs; (2) to enter
conditionally; or (3) to participate unconditionally.
‘‘Either they don’t participate, they are too inexperi-
enced to realize what they can lose, or they don’t put
background IP in the project, leave out the most ‘criti-
cal’ background IP, or find a way to get around strict
clauses in the contract,’’ one TTO interviewee stated.
Industry interviewees indicated that background IP
was the most contentious part of PPP negotiations.
They acknowledged the difficulties for SMEs to
enter a PPP, but were convinced that there are creative
ways to guarantee success. Industry perceived TTOs
as tough negotiators in IP discussions. One industry in-
terviewee stated that ‘‘for industry’s know-how, the ac-
ademia need to give some of their proprietary
knowledge in return,’’ whereby he means that if aca-
demics want to gain insight into industry’s know-
how by participating in the partnerships, they need
to give something in return, such as access to relevant
background IP for research use and the foreground IP
(the IP rights generated by the partners within the
framework of the project) generated by the project.
Unsurprisingly, all interviewees emphasized a des-
perate need for good PPP agreements with clear defi-
nitions. The majority of interviewees claimed that
‘‘good communication, especially related to IP issues,
results in good collaboration.’’ Academic, TTO, and
SME interviewees stated that being alert, but flexible,
is important when dealing with industry partners. One
interviewee representing industry noted that academ-
ic/TTO partners are often too demanding when it
comes to IP. He stated that the commercial value of
the IP is often overestimated by the TTO, and that
they often do not acknowledge the risks for pharma-
ceutical companies, which slows down the translation
of academic findings to commercially marketed prod-
ucts. The SMEs pointed to their lack of experienced IP
negotiators and the need for help during IP negotia-
tions. An SME interviewee said that industry has bet-
ter lawyers, and the negotiations are all about finding
the balance of power. The majority of the industrial in-
terviewees said that although there is a difference in
cultures between partners, there is always a solution.
‘‘We are still at the beginning of the learning curve.
It’s always best to start from the PPP’s guidelines if
available,’’ they argued.
All interviewees stated that negotiations on owner-
ship of foreground IP does not cause as many prob-
lems. A company representative claimed that it is no
goal of precompetitive research to generate IP, but if
it comes to that point, it could be equally divided
among the participants.
A good and clear IP framework from the start, in-
cluding term sheets and general IP clauses included
in the collaboration agreement, is a proposed solution
for the lack of trust between the stakeholders in rela-
tion to the accompanying IP issues. Another solution
is to define expectations well in advance—and proba-
bly to lower them a bit. One interviewee stated that
complementarity between stakeholders increases
trust. The ownership of foreground IP, or the right of
first refusal—in case foreground IP is jointly owned
and is licensed—poses no problems, as the stakehold-
ers have different interests for commercialization. For
example, a specific cell line is developed as a research
tool in a project. Different parties will be interested in
different aspects: a university may want to have access
to the cell lines to test compounds or to investigate cer-
tain pathways, a biotechnology company can exploit
and commercialize the cell line, and a pharmaceutical
company will be interested to have access to the cell
line to validate drug candidates.
A thorough screening of partners in advance was
seen to be important for academic interviewees. One
such interviewee said: ‘‘To generate IP, partners are
better off in a bilateral agreement than in a PPP.’’ Inter-
viewees from the academic, biotechnology SMEs, and
the pharma sector stated that such precompetitive part-
nerships are ideal platforms to get to know your part-
ners. ‘‘Precompetitive research is the stage where you
generate fundamental knowledge of interest to all par-
ties; it’s the stage before translating this knowledge
into health products or therapies in a bilateral partner-
ship,’’ one interviewee explained.
One Size Does Not Fit All
The interviewees from the validation round recog-
nized most of the motives and concerns of the experts
and provided additional comments regarding the IP
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framework. Apart from one precompetitive PPP, the
PPPs have a flexible IP framework where different
stakeholder groups can negotiate the terms. ‘‘Flexibil-
ity of the IP framework,’’ they stated, ‘‘is very impor-
tant to come to an agreement.’’ It is important for the
different actors that they can negotiate an agreement
that is aligned with the company’s or institution’s
regulations and that creates a base for trust. ‘‘Precom-
petitive for some implies competitive for others,
depending on the type of organization and point in
time.’’ Some precompetitive PPPs offer their help to
SMEs during the negotiations, acting as a neutral IP
specialist—an ‘‘honest broker,’’ which facilitates ne-
gotiations and IP management in the interests of all
parties. All managing directors stated that good com-
munication and showing evidence of early successes
can convince skeptics to participate. Managers of
precompetitive PPPs acknowledged the important net-
working opportunity, and witnessed new collaborations
resulting from these PPPs. Three managers of precom-
petitive PPPs stated that patent(s) (applications) are not
the sole measure for the performance of the PPP. ‘‘It’s
the combination of short-term output and outcome in
the long term,’’ one validation interviewee said.
DISCUSSION
The pharmaceutical industry relied on the tradi-
tional risk–reward model for a very long time.26 To
overcome the current crisis in drug development, par-
ticipation of profit- and non-profit stakeholders in
more dynamic collaborative R&Dmodels might be in-
strumental.
Precompetitive PPPs should enhance basic knowl-
edge, pooling of research data, and development of
technology platforms. The first results are expected
in the near future. Depending on the point in time
and the organizational structure, the definition of ‘‘pre-
competitive’’ might differ. There is a grey zone be-
tween precompetitive and competitive research.
Many precompetitive PPPs go beyond defining a hy-
pothesis and include target identification and valida-
tion in the projects.24 On the other hand, some
PD PPPs are present earlier in the drug development
process and start their work with initial compound
testing.38 Somewhere in between—and often overlap-
ping—are POC PPPs. These groups increase the value
of compounds, making them more attractive to phar-
maceutical companies for further investment and
entrance into expensive clinical trials.39 In this way,
POC PPPs have a vital role in filling up the grey zone
and bridging the so-called ‘‘valley of death’’11,40,41
(i.e., the situation where risky projects are abandoned
because of lack of funds required during extended
time periods, rather than because of negative research
outcomes).
R&D PPPs are knowledge-based relations; hence,
the management of IP rights is of critical importance.
There was little consensus among the interviewees on
how the IP management should be optimally orga-
nized to preserve the interests of all parties. In regard
to foreground IP, interviewees had only a few con-
cerns. If complementarity is obtained and the project
leads to foreground IP, negotiations on the exploitation
of the research results may not pose many problems, as
different partners have different objectives and thus
claim rights in different fields of applications. How-
ever, the foreground IP and the background IP are
often interlinked, which then, of course, requires ac-
cess rights to the background IP. It was exactly the ex-
treme reach-through access rights to background IP
that caused tensions and suspicion, according to the in-
terviewees. Notwithstanding the abundance of pre-
competitive PPPs, their impact and performance can
be at stake when there is a lack of trust among the
stakeholders, which lack may find its origin in the IP
hurdles—especially the access to background IP and
information sharing.
Through their hybrid structure, PPPs are subject to
unbalanced power relations between academia, SMEs,
and industry.42 For academia, besides publishing, re-
searchers are stimulated by the prospect of commer-
cially valorizing research results, and hence, being
remunerated with extra research funding; and TTOs,
linked to academia, support the set-up of spin-out
companies and patent filing. This changing role of ac-
ademia toward more entrepreneurial activities has
been discussed extensively43 and often creates ten-
sions with industrial partners. For biotechnology
SMEs developing technology platforms and research
tools, patents are at the core of their business portfo-
lios. Biopharmaceutical companies become competi-
tors the moment a target compound is identified;
38www.mmv.org/research-development/r-d-process
39http://lrd.kuleuven.be/en/tc/cd3-1/cd3-discovery-of-innovative-
medicines, 2011.
40Gulbranson CA, Audretsch DB. Proof of concept centers: ac-
celerating the commercialization of university innovation. J
Technol Transfer 2008;33:249–258.
41Rai AK, Reichman JH, Uhlir PF, Crossman C. Pathways
across the valley of death: novel intellectual property strategies
for accelerated drug discovery. In: Van Overwalle G, editor.
Gene Patents and Collaborative Licensing Models. Patent
Pools, Clearinghouses, Open Source Models and Liability
Regimes. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp
247–288.
42Ciccone DK. Arguing for a centralized coordination solution
to the public–private partnership explosion in global health.
Global Health Promotion 2010;17(48).
43Van Looy B, Landoni P, Callaert J, van Pottelsberghe B, Sap-
salis E, Debackere K. Entrepreneurial effectiveness of Euro-
pean universities: an empirical assessment of antecedents and
trade-offs. Research Policy 2011;40:553–564.
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facilitating tools are precompetitive research. Clearly,
both academia and SMEs wished to appropriate their
findings; often, this background IP was seen as a hur-
dle to participation in precompetitive PPPs. For these
stakeholders, it often was difficult not to give away
their core technology.44
Valuation of early stage research is difficult.45,46 An
industry representative critiqued TTOs for often over-
estimating the commercial value of IP, slowing down
translation of academic findings into commercially
marketed products. Furthermore, this could lead to ac-
ademics and pharmaceutical companies being opposed
to collaboration.47 All partners have to make the due
diligence exercise for themselves and for their future
partners.7 This was seen as a major challenge in pre-
competitive PPP negotiations. Findings need to gain
value with every further step in the R&D cycle. A po-
tential valuation disconnect between the partners is
thus lying in wait.48 Industry, SMEs, and academia
need to collaborate to increase the value by translating
early findings into potential drug compounds. The PPP
managing bodies can help overcome IP hurdles.49
Networking Platform
Precompetitive PPPs are a platform for scientists
sharing thoughts and ideas, gaining more insight into
scientific enigmas, and discovering breakthroughs
and disruptive innovations. Industrial partners are
highly interested in the scientific performance of uni-
versities as a selection criteria for future collabora-
tions.43 On the other hand, academics fear they will
miss visibility and potential collaboration opportuni-
ties if they do not participate in PPPs.49 The conclu-
sions of the literature on this subject are supported
by the views of the interviewees, who perceive pre-
competitive PPPs as a platform for partner scouting,
networking, and selection.
In precompetitive PPPs, the partners should focus
on working with the best scientists and take the oppor-
tunity to exploit further partnerships: the managers of
precompetitive PPPs acknowledge the importance
of doing this. While it’s too early to obtain hard fig-
ures on the outcome of precompetitive PPPs, there
is evidence of new collaborations among partners.
Therefore, one measure of the performance of precom-
petitive PPPs might be the number of partnerships
established afterwards (or in parallel), in combination
with the outcome (for example in terms of publica-
tions and patents) of those partnerships. After having
scouted for the best future partners in a precompetitive
PPP, the innovative solution to the problem—and re-
lated foreground IP—can be developed in another
(PPP) collaborative model. In this way, besides in-
creasing the value of future drug development, the
value of the partnership itself is increased.
The level of trust among stakeholder groups needs
to be increased for precompetitive PPPs to become ef-
fective networking platforms. For the PPPs to be infor-
mation-sharing platforms, flexibility in the IP policy
might be of key importance.27,50 The aim of precom-
petitive PPPs is to boost pharmaceutical innovation
and to help finding answers to the increasing techno-
logical and regulatory complexity that the pharmaceu-
tical industry faces. Results from precompetitive PPPs
projects should stimulate and form the base of an open
platform for further drug development. However, the
open-ended nature of precompetitive PPPs introduces
complexities on the level of IP rights. More specifically,
to accommodate the requisite ‘‘openness,’’ a maxi-
mum amount of information should be shared. IP
frameworks should leave enough room for stakehold-
ers to decide on a case-by-case basis ownership or ac-
cess rights. Flexibility in the IP framework is thus
essential to ensure success.27,50 Clearly, this is not
straightforward to adopt, and it seems that there is
no ideal IP framework that suits all purposes. Open
source licenses,7,9,20,23,25,26,46 with IP clauses refer-
ring to full access rights to knowledge for scientific
purposes (but no commercial rights), could potentially
be a source of inspiration for the design of contrac-
tual clauses regarding access rights to background
IP. A combination of open source-inspired clauses
guiding initial knowledge exchange, with market
exploitation-oriented proprietary arrangements guid-
ing the development of foreground IP, might remedy
this situation. Furthermore, once the project enters
the proof-of-concept stage and can be commer-
cially valorized, an elaborated IP framework can be
negotiated and applied. This ‘‘stage gate’’ model for
contractual terms, reflecting the open-ended start,
could increase trust and clear early IP issues. In any
event, to deal with trust issues and IP issues, commu-
nication and training of the different stakeholders is
critical.
44Gilbert N. Universities shun Europe’s drug initiative. Nature
2010;466:306–307.
45Merz JF. Intellectual Property and Product Development Pub-
lic/Private Partnerships. Final Report, May 16, 2005 to the
World Health Organization Commission on Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, Innovation and Public Health. 2005.
46Bereuter TL, Jerolitsch D, Heimerl P. IPR Codes and Guide-
lines in Europe Facilitating Collaboration of Publicly Funded
Research Organizations (PROs) with Businesses (Part 1). les
Nouvelles 2011; September: 226–236.
47Schmidt C. Debate re-ignites on contribution of public re-
search to drug development. Nat Biotechnol 2011;29:469–470.
48Kotz J. Small (molecule) thinking in academia. Science–
Business eXchange 2011;4(22):1–4.
49Strohmeier R, Draghia-Akli R, Rys A, et al. IMI moves for-
ward. Nat Biotechnol 2011;29:689–790.
50Saez C. Partnership to share research, keep IP rights, on neg-
lected diseases. http://www.ip-watch.org/2011/06/01/partnership-
to-share-research-keep-ip-rights-on-neglected-diseases/
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METHODS
To investigate the precompetitive (bio)pharmaceu-
tical R&D PPP model, three primary data sources
were used: biomedical-economic literature, PPP web-
sites, and interviews with key informants from indus-
try and academia ( January–December 2011).
We examined publicly available information (e.g.,
PPPs websites, scientific databases, case studies) to
develop a census of the concept of precompetitive
PPPs, their mission, and strategy.
In parallel, we first conducted a semi-structured in-
terview round with key opinion leaders in the biophar-
maceutical field. The aim was to assess motives and
experiences regarding participation in precompetitive
PPPs, with a specific emphasis on the role of IP rights.
We developed a list of 22 experts using purposive sam-
pling. The experts represented different stakeholder
groups: big pharmaceutical companies (n = 5) and bio-
technology SMEs (n = 5), both representing the private
sector; academic researchers (n = 6), university tech-
nology transfer offices (TTOs)(n = 5), and a European
intergovernmental agency representative (n = 1)—the
three latter categories representing the not-for-profit
sector. Two academic experts that started a spin-off
company also answered from a biotechnology
SME point of view (thus, n = 5 + 2). The interview-
ees were based in Belgium, The Netherlands, the
United Kingdom (UK), and France. Two lists were
presented to the interviewees: one with motives for
participation in a precompetitive PPP, and a second
with motives not to participate. The interviewees
could also add motives. The interviewees were
asked to give their five highest-priority motives.
Interviews were analyzed qualitatively using
NVivo followed by a cross-case analysis to identify
consistent themes and patterns.
The second interview set was a validation round.
The results from the first interviews were presented
to experts leading a precompetitive PPP (n = 5), the
European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries
and Association (EFPIA) (n = 1), and a European
Commission Joint Research Center ( JRC) representa-
tive (n = 1). This allowed us to validate the results and
identify nuances of certain findings.
STUDY HIGHLIGHTS
The concept of life science R&D precompetitive PPPs
is young and requires further in-depth research.19,20,24
Precompetitive PPPs can help speed up the drug-develop-
ment process by stimulating competitors to collaborate in
the pre-discovery phase. By sharing knowledge with
peers and continuously scouting for further collaboration
opportunities, an innovation platform can be created.
It is important to emphasize that the motives for
participation and the expectations of different stake-
holder groups differ. The question of IP management
will likely remain a matter of debate,22 and the success
of PPPs depends on the attitude and expertise of the
participants. Instead of considering precompetitive
PPPs as collaborative models, wherein exclusive rights
are offered at bargain prices, stakeholders need to be-
come aware that the value of precompetitive PPPs lies
in the opportunity to scout for and network with the
best scientists. Collaboration will be the only way to
generate valuable IP.
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